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I t i s the purpose of t h i s paper to discuss Mr. P i t t a s 
f i n a n c i a l administration from 1784 to 1801. The subject nat-
u r a l l y divides i t s e l f into two almost equal parts. The f i r s t of 
these was a period of peace, and extends to the declaration of 
war, February 1,1793. The second part, on the other hand, was a 
period of war, and closes with the treaty of Amiens March; 27, 
1802. The problems "before P i t t during the peace period were 
those of f i n a n c i a l reform. For many years,either from incom-
petency or from insuperable d i f f i c u l t i e s , the ministers had made 
no attempt at reform. P i t t entered upon t h i s part of the work 
with a l l the energy c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of an ambitious young man. 
I t s h a l l be our duty, therefore,to recount with some d e t a i l the 
reforms introduced by him:how a clandestine trade was made to 
contribute to the revenue of the state,how fraud was eliminated 
from the revenue o f f i c e s and how the national debt was cared 
f o r by an automatic sinking fund. The report of the committee 
was 
of 1787,which the basis of P i t t ' s estimates i s also discussed 
with some minuteness. More i n t e r e s t i n g , however,than the re-
forming of taxes are the consolidation of duties and the t r e a -
ty of commerce with France. The former bore the mark of sim-
p l i c i t y ithe l a t t e r the tenor of f r i e n d s h i p . S t i l l more import-
ant, however, than these i s the economic progress of t h i s era, 
or to be more e x p l i c i t , the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution. To show 
how the factory system came into existence,how the peasant c l a s s 
became almost extinct and how as a r e s u l t of these England s h i f t -
ed from an a g r i c u l t u r a l basis to one of trade, i t i s our pur-
pose to explain. A l l these formed the e s s e n t i a l skeleton of a 
gigantic trade,important f o r the reason that customs duties 
and excise formed the l a r g e r portion of the m i n i s t e r s revenue. 
For the sake of getting a better understanding of the other 
taxes one or two have been described with some care,and these 
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also show the opposition that Mr. P i t t had to encounter. A few 
errors are next pointed out and the p r i n c i p l e s of a proper f i s -
system are l a i d down. I t i s next our i n t e n t i o n to show i n 
what way he neglected to b u i l d up a system adequate to meet the 
f i n a n c i a l needs of an emergency. This brings us then,to the 
second and more eventful period. The f i n a n c i a l side of Mr, 
P i t t ' s p o l i c y during the war we purpose to t r e a t i n the l i g h t 
of modern finance. The objection r a i s e d against such t r e a t -
ment possesses l i t t l e strength from the fact that,even though 
his pystem were examined i n the l i g h t of the experience 
a v a i l a b l e at that time h i s p o l i c y could hardly be j u s t i f i e d . 
Among others Adam Smith, Robert Hamilton and a l i t t l e l a t e r 
David Ricardo were the most famous writers of the time. Even 
Mr. P i t t , as w i l l appear,held correct views, with respect to 
some fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of finance. With regard to h i s war 
policy,then,we s h a l l endeavor to show first,how the minister 
attempted to increase the revenue by increasing the rate of tax-
ation,and secondly,his method of funding. Equally important 
and i n t e r e s t i n g i s his treatment of the bank. This i n s t i t u -
t i o n could point to a h i s t o r y of one hundred years, had devel-
oped a sound banking systemibut was forced to v i o l a t e a l l 
precedent as w i l l appear from the discussion. "Ho greater e v i -
dence, i n truth,could be given of the wonderful power wielded 
by Mr. P i t t at t h i s momentous c r i s i s , t h a n the influence he 
exercised and the hold he obtained on the leading c a p i t a l i s t s . 
Often he must have been at a loss how to solve the dilemma of 
negotiating loans, and i t must have been an irksome task to 




When P i t t "became prime minister i n 1784 English finance 
was In a deplorable condition. His predecessor had shown n e i -
ther o r i g i n a l i t y nor tact i n the management of public finance, 
and had turned to the Wealth of Nations f o r guidance. Lord 
North,however,failed to grasp the whole tr u t h of t h i s epoch-
making work,accepted the suggestion f o r increased taxation,but 
not those f o r either s i m p l i f y i n g the t a r i f f or consolidating 
the duties. Taxation under him was neither equal nor c e r t a i n , 
owing to the many abuses that existed in the realm of public 
finance. About the coast there flourished a clandestine trade 
which defied the vigilance of a l l customs o f f i c e r s . The method 
of c o l l e c t i n g and the system of accountability f o r funds ob-
tained from commerce and the various sources of taxation were 
such as s t i l l further to diminish the net income. Ho one exact.-
l y knew what the state of finance r e a l l y was; whether the debt 
was L238000000 or L290000000 lay i n the realm of mysterious 
uncertainty, and whether the L40000000 s t i l l unaccounted f o r 
would ever reach the national coffers was an equally mysterious 
question. 
One of the f i r s t abuses to which P i t t c a l l e d attention 
was the curse of smuggling. The committee,whose duty i t had 
been to investigate t h i s matter reported February 11,1784, that 
the loss sustained on tea, brandy and wine amounted at least 
to L2000000 annually. Parliament w e l l understood the im-
portance of t h i s statement and at once adopted a resolution to 
the effect that t h i s state of a f f a i r s deserved the e a r l i e s t 
and the most serious consideration. Accordingly on July the 
12th the house, a f t e r going Into a committee of the whole ,took 
up the consideration of a " B i l l f o r the prevention of smuggling? 
After having argued the question of justice,and what the e f f e c t 
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of a d d i t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s upon commerce would be, P i t t ' s prop-
o s i t i o n f o r simply lowering duties was agreed upon as the best 
remedy f o r smuggling. High duties ever encourage smuggling; 
because of the high profits,which act as a tempting bait to a l l 
who have an i n c l i n a t i o n f o r i t . . This was especially true i n 
those days when customs laws were l a x and supervision and en-
forcement i n e f f i c i e n t . 
Nor was the argument of j u s t i c e i n the discussion of so 
important a question altogether out of place. The two pa r t i e s 
involved evidently ought to receive due consideration. The 
f a i r trader,who was earning a legitimate p r o f i t , acted within 
the scope of the law,and consequently contributed to the welfare 
of the nation. The smuggler,on the other hand,was beyond the 
reach of law and was depriving the government of her national 
income. The question,then,was not one of p r a c t i c a b i l i t y , f o r 
everyone recognized thi s fact;but one of procedure. P i t t argued 
that t h i s object would be accomplished most ef f e c t u a l l y by 
making the p r o f i t s of both parties equal,a circumstance which 
would compel the smuggler to abandon his trade i f o r the reason 
that smuggling i s more expensive than legitimate trading. With 
t h i s end i n view P i t t proposed two means of stopping i t : f i r s t , 
by lowering the duties and secondly,by increasing the r i s k . 
The duty on tea,for this a r t i c l e was the staple of t h i s i l l i c i t 
trade,was at once reduced from 119^ to 12.5^. P i t t estimated 
that the annual consumption amounted to 130000001bs.of which 
but 55000001bs. paid l e g a l duty. Great was the aversion of the 
minister*s colleagues to l e t go such an important source of 
revenue,for i t s annual income amounted to about L700000ibut P i t t 
was w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e a l l t h i s f o r the sake of establishing 
a sound commercial p o l i c y . As a matter of fact the prime 
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m i n i s t e r gained by such a p o l i c y . F i r s t , t h e revenue on tea, 
contrary to expectation and i n consequence of increased l e g a l 
importation only f e l l o f f l/2,or L340000;instead of f o l l o w i n g 
a decrease proportionate to ths reduction on tea d u t i e s . Sec-
ondly, the window tax even though not as productive as the one 
i t was c a l c u l a t e d to displace was h i g h l y popular,especially 
among the lower c l a s s e s . For increasing the r i s k i t waB prop-r. 
osed,that a l l vessels s p e c i a l l y b u i l t f o r smuggling and found 
w i t h i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s of the B r i t i s h coast should 
be l i a b l e to c o n f i s c a t i o n . The Hovering Act prescribed a l i m i t 
of two leagues,but t h i n k i n g that t h i s provided too narrow a 
b e l t around the B r i t i s h c o a s t , P i t t proposed to increase i t 
to f o u r . 
A f t e r having thus provided i n some measure f o r a more 
r e l i a b l e income the m i n i s t e r next proceeded to construct proper 
channels through which the revenue might flow i n t o the n a t i o n a l 
c o f f e r s . Hitherto the flow of revenue had been too often d i v e r t e d 
from i t s proper course and became more and more slender as i t 
approached the n a t i o n a l treasury,owing l a r g e l y to the method 
of c o l l e c t i n g , a n d the manner i n which the p u b l i c money was ac-
counted f o r to the exchequer. Much had already been done to 
improve the former. Tax commissioners were paid f i x e d s a l a r i e s 
In order that they might be more independent,and were also com-
p e l l e d by Parliament to t r a n s f e r the sums i n t h e i r hands as 
s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e . But i n other l i n e s much remained to be 
done ye t . The p u b l i c o f f i c e s f o r example required remodelling. 
The navy o f f i c e , i n f e r i o r to none but the pay o f f i c e was the 
f i r s t to receive the m i n i s t e r ' s a t t e n t i o n . Hitherto i t had 
possessed ne i t h e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y nor an e f f i c i e n t 3ystem of 
accountiifog. Balances had been allowed to l i e and accumulate in 
the hands of o f f i c e r s long a f t e r they q u i t the p u b l i c s e r v i c e . 
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This wasteful practice encourged s t i l l more by the proverbial 
slowness of the exshequer i n passing upon public accounts,and 
by the old machinery employed,which as P i t t f i t t i n g l y said was 
now i n f i n i t e l y too d i l a t o r y and too i n t r i c a t e f o r the enlarged 
business of the present expenditure. The plan adpoted,although 
specifying nothing^fVom our point of view no doubt was a surprise 
f o r the public accountants. I t s provisions were simple but im-
portant. Every treasurer on q u i t t i n g his o f f i c e was now com-
pelled to transfer the balances to his successor and also close 
hi s accounts every year. Hitherto the subaccountants had been 
the p r i n c i p a l obstacle i n permitting the terasurer close h i s 
accountsjbecause of the interdependent r e l a t i o n s of the two. 
But to expedite matters l i t t l e more i t was now provided that 
the subaccountants should be d i r e c t l y responsible to the ex-
chequer and transmit to the navy department only a statement 
showing how the money had been spend.# The examination of pu b l i c 
accounts,a matter of no l i t t l e consequence,also received the 
minister's attention. This function supposedly "belonged to the 
Auditors of the Imprest,but was geratly abused. The main du-
t i e s were la r g e l y performed by clerks,destitute a l i k e of both 
sympathy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . P i t t meant to abolish this o f f i c e 
which had become a sinecure and proposed a new one at once more 
e f f i c i e n t and more economical. Accordingly on March the 8th, 
1785,leave was given to bring i n a b i l l providing f o r a "board 
of commissioners,whose duty I t should be to enquire into the 
f e e s , g r a t u i t i e s and emoluments,which had l a t e l y been received 
In the public o f f i c e s , t o examine into the abuses,which existed 
i n the same and to report better methods 6*f managing the business 
transacted i n said o f f i c e s • This was but a temporary measure, 
to continue In force t i l l the end of the next session of P a r l i -
ament. A l l precautions necessary to make t h i s body e f f i c i e n t 
#Parl.Hist.25:298sq. 
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were taken. The commissioners could send f o r persons,papers 
and records,which i n any way might furt h e r t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n ^ 
To another board c o n s i s t i n g of f i v e commissioners most ample 
powers f o r auditing p u b l i c accounts of every department were 
given. I t was t h i s board that displaced the Auditors of the 
Imprest# 
In the next month(April 11,1785) the question of reduc-
ing the national debt was taken up. To inform Parliament on the 
state of revenue,the m i n i s t e r moved that the net produce f o r 
the quarters ending January 5,1783 and 1784, and those ending 
A p r i l 5,1784 and 1785 be l a i d before the house. These quarters 
were selected i n order to show that the revenue was on the i n -
crease, and that a surplus was accumulating. In considering so 
important a question two fa c t o r s must receive the c l o s e s t a t -
tention :revenue and expenditure. According to P i t t ' s c a l c u l a -
t i o n , the former was about L15000000 and the l a t t e r somewhat 
over L140O00O0,leaving a surplus of 1900000. Pitt»s object 
was to e s t a b l i s h a sinking fund of L1000000. The L10OOO0 s t i l l 
l a c k i n g he proposed to r a i s e from a d d i t i o n a l duties on s p i r i t s 
imported timber, perfumery and hairpowder. "This m i l l i o n l a i d 
out w i t h i t s growing interestJ'the minister s a i d ^ w i l l amount to 
a very great sum i n a period that i s not very long i n the l i f e 
of an individual,and but an hour i n the existence of a n a t i o n . 
In a period of tw$nty-eight years the sum of a m i l l i o n an-
nually improved w i l l amount to L4000000 per annum? P r a c t i c a l l y 
every member approved the p r i n c i p l e of t h i s measure,but many 
opposed the mode of creating the fund. Foremost among these 
were Fox and Sheridan. P i t t himself thought that a surplus 
was the surest foundation f o r such a fund. In opposition to 
^Statutes 34 c.19. #Lecky 5:32,33. 
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the minister's statement they placed the assertion that there 
was as yet no surplus,and that the quarters selected were no 
f a i r criterionjbecause the r e s u l t had not been based upon the 
average of a number of years. The expenditure,on the other hand, 
was not based upon the present expenditure,but upon the peace 
establishment as computed "by the committee of 1786. Others 
t r i e d to accelerate the measure with undue haste. They pointed 
to France,the natural enemy of England,who had already estab-
l i s h e d a sinking fund,which would i n a few years pay off the 
greater portion of her debt. Since England could not affo r d 
to be outstripped by an enemy,they urged P i t t to borrow a m i l -
l i o n rather than not begin the fund at once. To make the sink 1* 
Ing fund unalienable i n times of peace,as w e l l as i n war,the 
»J.nister proposed to place the money i n the hands of commis-
sioners, to be applied i n quarterly buying up stock. Fox seriously 
objected to such i d o l a t r y . A sinking fund,no doubt,should be 
unalienable i n times of peace,for during such times taxation 
should be s u f f i c i e n t not merely to cover the expenditure,but 
also provide f o r a reasonable reduction of the debt. Fox, 
therefore,sought to improve t h i s measure by moving that i n case 
a'loan was hereafter made new taxes should also be imposed not 
only to pay the i n t e r e s t on the loan,but also restore to the 
sinking fund what had been taken from i t . The motion was agreed 
to,and on March26,1786 the b i l l received the royal sanction.^ 
In the evolution of such a theory of amortization P i t t 
drew heavily upon the theories of Dr. P r i c e . According to 
Price i t was p e r f e c t l y proper to borrow money f o r maintaining 
a s i n k i n g fund,in as much as the sums borrowed are obtained 
at simple i n t e r e s t and are invested at compound. A comparison 
of the re s u l t s obtained drom the c a l c u l a t i o n of the two,indeed, 
#Parl.HIst.25:419,1294sq. 
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s t r i k e s one with great f a s c i n a t i o n . Compound interest,however, 
i s merely a c a l c u l a t i o n amid f i n d s no corresponding p a r t i n the 
order of production. In the economic world two times two do 
not always make four,but sometimes only one. P i t t as w e l l as 
P r i c e made the mistake i n looking at government stock as pro-
ductive property. The i n t e r e s t accruing thereon they considered 
as earnings;while as a matter of f a c t i t was but the produce of 
t a x a t i o n . Since the government could not be at the same time 
both c r e d i t o r and debtor f o r i t s own incumbrances,it became ne-
cessary to create a second party; and the l e g a l f i c t i o n was, 
therefore,set up making the government debtor to the commis-
sioners. The stock acquired by the commissioners represented 
extinguished debt and should have been cancelled;but f o r the 
sake of t h i s l e g a l f i c t i o n they were considered active o b l i -
gations on which i n t e r e s t should be paid, u n t i l the whole debt 
was bought up. For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y l e t us assume adebt 
of L20000000 with a y e a r l y i n t e r e s t of 5^. So long as t h i s 
debt remains unpaid,the country must submit to a t a x a t i o n of 
L1000000 annually to pay the i n t e r e s t thereon. But i f L20O0OO 
of the p r i n c i p a l has been paid,that i s , i f stock to that amount 
has been bought up,the i n t e r e s t on that L200000 i s no longer 
due to the commissi oners, but f a l l s to the government, when a t 
the end of the f i r s t year the government pays to the commission^ 
ers "the L10000 i n t e r e s t , t h e n L21000G of debt w i l l have been ex-
tinguished; and L210000 Is p r e c i s e l y the c a p i t a l which would 
have accumulated f o r a year a t compound i n t e r e s t . The r e s u l t s 
of the two are the same,but the means are t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t . 
TheL200000 i n order to operate at compound i n t e r e s t must be i n -
vested i n productive property,and the p r o f i t s instead of being 
consumed must be r e g u l a r l y added to the p r i n c i p a l to form new 
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c a p i t a l . P i t t ' s sinking fund did not operate i n t h i s mannert 
because the government s e c u r i t i e s were not productive property. 
There could be therefore no increase i n c a p i t a l , n o r could any 
inherent q u a l i t i e s be ascribed to the sinking fund. During the 
e n t i r e l i f e of the debt the i n t e r e s t on i t remained the same 
and had to be raised by t a x a t i o n . This fund moreover,was too 
complex. P r e c i s e l y the same resu l t s might have been reached 
by appropriating permanently a f i x e d sum,larger than the i n t e r e s t 
charge,and by applying the excess to the p r i n c i p a l . This excess 
would increase each year i n proportion as the i n t e r e s t charge 
shrunk. P i t t meant to s t a r t h i s sinking fund witha sur p l u s i 
but as a matter of f a c t there was as yet no surplus. The quar-
ters,which he had made the basis of h i s c a l c u l a t i o n j u s t i f i e d 
him i n saying that the revenue was on the increase;but not i n 
as s e r t i n g that there was on hand already a surplus of L90QOOO. 
This increase i n revenue was due more to the increase i n commerce 
than anything e l s e . England was once more entering upon an era 
of commercial prosperity. The values of her imports, which 
were but L115O0OOO i n 1783 next year rose to L13000000 and the 
year f a l l o w i n g to L1550O000. To argue that revenue was increas-
ing was therefore p e r f e c t l y easyjbecause the customs and the 
excise duties formed the p r i n c i p a l sources of n a t i o n a l income. 
They were estimated by the committee of 1786, f o r the previous 
year at L450O0O0 and L5282000 r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^ I t was not here 
that P i t t influenced by the report of the committee made h i s 
mistake. The error was made with respect to other sources of 
income. The prospective estimates f o r the next f i v e years as 
worked out by the committee were altogether too high. But t h i s 
d i f f e r e n c e became much l e s s toward the close of t h i s period, 
<Parl. Hist.29:453. 
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on account of the increased commerce. The deficiencies,on the 
other hand,fell upon the "beginning of these f i r e years. The 
committee of 1786 had placed the income f o r the same year at 
nearly L15400000,"but there can "be l i t t l e doubt that they wide-
l y missed the mark.^ The average of 1786,1787,exclusive of 
the land and malt taxes amounted to L12295000,being L501808 le s s 
than the sum estimated. For 1786,1787,1788,L12468O0Ojbeing 
L329000 less than the sum estimated. For 1786,1787,1788,1789, 
L12653000;being L143000 less than the sum estimated. For 1786 
1787,1788,1789,1790, L2879000jbeing L81837 more than the sum 
estimated. This report,which was the result of a warm discus-
sion i n Parliament p l a i n l y shows the trend of revenue during 
these years,and where the deficiency ought to be placed. But 
fo r the sake of proving that the greatest deficiency during 
these f i v e years wo-.s i n 1786,let us apply these s t a t i s t i c s i n 
d i f f e r e n t manner. For 1789,1790,the average was L13496000jbeing 
L698000 more thanthe sum estimated. For 1788, 1789, 1790, 
L13268000jbeing L470930 more than the sum estimated. For 1787 
1788,1789,17Q0, L13140000jbeing L342000 more than the sum es-
timated. For 1786,1787,1788,1789,1790,L12879000Jbeing L81837 
more thanthe sum estimated.# Judging from these reports the 
deficiency i n 1786 must have been enormous. The r e s u l t s , how-
ever, turn s t i l l more against the committee,if the land and 
malt taxes are included. These were estimated to y i e l d L2750000, 
but produced only L2450000.& A further reason that there must 
have been a considerable deficiency i n 1786 was the f a c t that 
th i s year had been p e c u l i a r l y unproductive i n revenue,owing to 
the decrease of imports. In sugar alone according to P i t t ' s 
budget speech of 1787 there was a f a l l i n g o ff of L350000. The 
mistake of the committee,however,was s t i l l more pronounced on 
^Parl.Hist.26:1014. *Parl.Hist.29:722. &Parl.Hist.24:1351. 
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the side of expenditure. They had placed the expenses f o r 1786 
at L1440000,at least L2500000 too low. The interest and other 
charges on the public debt alone amounted to over L9O0O0O0,the 
expenditure f o r the navy stood at L2500000,and those of the 
army including ordnance at L2000000. These items alone came 
dangerously near the amount allowed by the committee,without i n r 
eluding the exchequer b i l l s ( L 2 5 8 0 0 0 ) , c i v i l list(E9Q0O0O),militia 
(L91000)and miscellaneous services(L74000). The two expense 
items i n which the committee made th e i r most serious mistake 
were the navy and the army expenditures. For the former they 
allowed L1800000 and f o r the l a t t e r L1600000,exclusive of ord-
nance charges. But these two expense items,although varying 
somewhat from year to year never f e l l during th i s period to 
this estimate,excepting perhaps the expenditure of the army. 
Xn 1790 the expenditure stood a t L16798000The committee 
had allowed f o r the same year L15912000,exclusive M th6 m i l i t i a 
which stood i n 1^85 at L91000, making a t o t a l of L16822000. 
Sheridan argued that the expenditure,since 1786 exceeded on an 
average the ca l c u l a t i o n of the committee by about L1000000 year-
ly,which had been defrayed by extraordinary aid. But since the 
expenditure allowed was s u f f i c i e n t i t follows that the deficiency 
occurred i n the beginning of this period. The revenue of 1790 
also showed a remarkable increase. The committee had placed i t 
at L14072000,exclusive of the land and malt taxes,which stood 
at L2600000,making a t o t a l of 16672000. This increase i n revenue 
was l a r g e l y due to the increase i n commerce,a circumstance, 
which the committee did not and could not foresee. The im-
ports rose from L11000000 i n 1783 to L16LLLLLL i n 1790, and the 
exports from L12000000 to L17000000. 
^Levi p.63. 
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A b r i e f account of England's commercial history,however, 
i s necessary f o r a complete understanding of these f a c t s . In 
the economic history of England no period i s of greater import-
ance than the one included within 1793 and 1815. On the con^ 
tinent t h i s was a period of war,and some of the greatest changes 
that ever occurred i n p o l i t i c a l l i n e s were being attempted. In 
England,on the other hand,a great revolution,economic i n i t s 
nature was disturbing the very foundations of her democracy and 
society. Economists are generally agreed as to the great im-
portance of this period i n the development of her I n d u s t r i a l 
History."aa well as i t s bearing on her p o l i t i c a l system. I t 
was e s s e n t i a l l y a period of a far-reaching economic revolution, 
a p e r i o d of t r a n s i t i o n from the old systems to the new. In i n -
dustry from the domestic system to the factory system,in com-
merce from protection toward free trade\in agriculture from the 
open f i e l d system to the enclosed one and i n p o l i t i c s from p o l -
i t i c a l slavery toward p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y . In short the whole 
nation was i n a process of t r a n s i t i o n , s h i f t i n g from the s o l i d 
a g r i c u l t u r a l basis to the more unstable basis of trade. 
But i n order to discuss t h i s period more i n t e l l i g e n t l y 
we should give ourselves more elbow-room,and extend i t s time 
l i m i t s . The years between 1760 and 1830 have been characterized 
by economic writers as the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution. The l a t t e r 
half of the 18th century was especially noted f o r the intense 
a c t i v i t y of the English mind,as i s shown by the many inventions 
made.andthe p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of these to the various i n -
dust r i e s . Such men as Arkwright,Cartwright and James Watt, 
and a host of others each one contributing his share,became the 
pioneers of this economic revolution,and made i t possible to 
break away from the domestic system. These inventions acted l i k e 
a magnet on capital,which was now concentrated f o r various 
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purposes. Laborers were put to work f o r regular hours,where the 
machines were placed. Thus grew up f a c t o r i e s i n our modern 
sense. These changes i n manufacture and labor came about ear-
l i e s t i n the t e x t i l e industries,and increased t h e i r output of 
manufactured goods by leaps and bounds. In 1764 the cotton im>~ 
ported into England amounted to only 40000001bs. ,an i n s i g n i f i * -
cant figure,indeed,but by 1841 i t had already reached the as-
tonishing sum of 489^000001bs. Indeed,so rapid was this inv 
crease that i n the f i f t e e n years following the a p p l i c a t i o n of 
steam to the cotton industries,1^85,the cotton trade had trebled 
i t s e l f . With this enormous progress i n production there came 
likewise a revolution i n d i s t r i b u t i o n . A concentrated industry 
l i k e the cotton industry would have been impossible unless i t 
could command a world market. To this end great changes were 
made. On sea English ships plowed the ocean everywhere. In 
England i t s e l f extensive i n t e r n a l improvements were made,canals 
were dug,roads improved and railroads constructed. Other i n -
dustries again were forced to seek more convenient quarters. As 
a r e s u l t the woolen manufactories of the eastern counties de-
cayed and were superseded by those of the north. The i r o n i n -
dustry l e f t the woodland counties of Surrey and Sussex and found 
a new home i n the Midlands,Yorkshire and South Vales,where coal 
was p l e n t i f u l and cheap. This change produced the most f a r -
reaching results i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of population. The coun-
t i e s i n the south l o s t t h e i r people,while those of the north, 
where the new industries were being established greatly increased 
i n population. On the whole the industries capable of tremens 
dous extension were most affected by the new inventions. The 
new appliances at f i r s t tended to raise the wages of the spinners 
and the weavers,owing to the great prosperity I t brought to the 
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trade;but with the introduction of the factory system f e l l again. 
But there was s t i l l another great change j u s t as import-
ant and as far-reaching i n re s u l t s as the one mentioned above. 
This was the Agrarian Revolution,which caused the e x t i n c t i o n 
of the peasant c l a s s . How these yeomen were dispossessed and 
how large farmers took t h e i r places i s one of the most i n t e r s 
esting features i n the h i s t o r y of English a g r i c u l t u r e . For 
generations they had been able to carry on a precarious e x i s t * 
ence onlyjbecause of the antiquated methods of farming and on 
account of t h e i r indolence. The open f i e l d system was to a 
large extent the cause of the lack of progress i n a g r i c u l t u r e , 
and a t the close of the 18th century s t i l l three f i f t h s of the 
c u l t i v a t e d land was t i l l e d i n th i s way. A system which had 
survived unchanged since the Norman conquest might be supposed 
to possess realt advantages. But what had made i t l o n g - l i v e d 
f a r more than the i n t r i n s i c advantages was the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of changing i t . Reform had to be wholesale or not at a l l . 
Happily here too the reformer was not wanting. Arthur Young 
took i t upon himself to di s t r o y the old system by urging on 
enlosures,which a f t e r being once started proceeded with remark-
able r a p i d i t y . During the reign' of George 11.226 priv a t e acts 
were passed i n t h i r t y - three years providing f o r enclosures. 
During the reign of George I I I . , t h a t i s between 1797 to 1820 
especially,the number increased to 1797,besides the general en-
closure act of 1801. TTnlike the en closures of the 15th and 
16th centuries,which had been i n the main f o r sheep farming , 
these were f o r a bettersystem of a g r i c u l t u r e . The r e s u l t of 
a l l the hardships wrought by t h i s t r a n s i t i o n was that the yeo-
man l o s t h i s land. Some went to the c i t i e s , b u t the l a r g e r 
number became wage-laborers on farmsibeause they could not hope 
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to compete with the landlord,who had c a p i t a l at his disposal 
and therefore farmed i n accordance with the "best methods known. 
Another reason f o r the decay of the peasant class was the f a c t 
that land was a good investment,even better than money. I t a l -
so gave the landlord s o c i a l prestige. He could neither s i t i n 
Parliament,nor vote In the county unless he was a man of some 
means. For t h i s reason,then,many such ambitious men were seek-
ing to q u a l i f y as country gentlemen. He therefore,bought out 
the freeholder,who was glad to sell,because of the high prices 
that land commanded during the Mapol^onic wars. But t h i s was 
not a l l . The landed gentry a f t e r having thus q u a l i f i e d next pro-
ceeded to maintain the pric e of corn,which was subject to the 
most extreme f l u c t u a t i o n s . From 51s per quarter i n 1798 i t 
rose to 120s i n 1801, then dropped to 58s i n 1803 and a f t e r 
several minor fluctuations reached the high watermark of 126a 
i n 1812. By 1815 i t was again down to 66s,but rose once more 
to 96s In 1817. Ko doubt a succession of bad harvest i n 1800, 
1804,1809 and 1816 contributed much toward such unsteadiness 
i n value,but a cause equally severe on England was the c l o s -
ing of the Baltic;because she had ceased to be s e l f support-
ing and was importing her foodstuffs. 
The two great measures of P i t t no doubt were the com-
mercial propositions r e l a t i n g to Ireland and the treaty with 
France. The o r i g i n a l propositions,which were accepted by the 
I r i s h Parliament would have established complete free trade, 
commercial equality and r e c i p r o c i t y between England and I r e -
land. The scheme was eminently l i b e r a l and wiseibut English 
manufacturers compelled P i t t to modify the o r i g i n a l proposi-
tions to such an extent as to endanger thereby the independence 
of the I r i s h Parliament. Preferring independence to commercial 
advantages they chose to reject the amended measures. With the 
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treaty 6f France,however,Pitt was more successful. February 
12,1787,the house resolved i t s e l f into a committee of the whole 
f o r considering the commercial treaty with France. The pro-
visions of t h i s celebrated treaty were as follows: the wines 
of France should pay no higher duty i n Great B r i t a i n than those 
of Portugal;the duty on French vinegar i n #reat B r i t a i n should 
be reduced from L6 7,5s,6d to 7s per gallon;the duties on hard-
ware, cutlery , cabinet ware,steel and copper should not exceed 
10^ i n either country;theduties on cotton and woolen manufact-
ures should not exceed 12^ i n both countries,excepting those 
mixed with silks,which were prohibited on both sides. Porcelain, 
earthenware and pottery should pay 12^ ad valorem. Such were 
the most essential terms of t h i s famous treaty. P i t t contended 
that from a commercial point of view no treaty could be more 
advantageous. The two countries supplemented each other i n a 
peculiar manner,because each one had i t s d i s t i n c t staples and 
produced i n abundance what the other wanted. France had an 
advantage i n so i l , c l i m a t e and i n the amount of natural produce. 
The wines and the brandies were p e c u l i a r l y her own productions. 
Great Britain,on the other hand, was superior i n manufactures, 
especially woolen a r t i c l e s . Hot t i l l the s o i l of France was so 
altered by the hand of nature as to produce the raw material 
could France ever hope to compete with England. The a r t i c l e s 
of sadlery,of pottery and of hardware were equally commodities 
of England,and could withstand foreign competition as long as 
bark,clay and coal were the productions of the English s o i l . 
P i t t argued further that the treaty would be b e n e f i c i a l i n a 
commercial way,and at the same time reduce the temptation f o r 
smuggling. The French wines found t h e i r way to England,in spite 
of the high duties and the b i t t e r animosities between the two 
nations. Besides the large i l l e g a l import i n t h i s a r t i c l e of 
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consumption,"between 300000 and 400000 gallons of French brandy-
was also smuggled inevery year. A l l t h i s would add considerably 
to the national income i f imported i n a l e g a l manner. 
But i n spite of a l l the advantages the treaty met with 
the keenest opposition,especially i n the house of Commons. Here 
P i t t had arrayed against himself a w e l l organized opposition, 
including the best men i n Parliament,such as Fox,Burke,Sheridan, 
Francis and Henry Flood,a thorough-going m e r c a n t i l i s t . I t i s 
a mistake,however,to think that t h i s organized opposition i n 
any way re f l e c t e d the opinion of the constituents. Public 
opinion was with P i t t and generally speaking was i n favor of 
the t r e a t y . I t did not manifest i t s e l f inloud clamors f o r t h i s 
measure,but i n a mute eloquence,which,especially that of the 
manufacturers might w e l l be construed i n favor of the Anglo-
French treaty. "In four or f i v e months only one p e t i t i o n of im-
portance came up,not objecting to the treaty,but merely asking 
f o r an extension of time to consider i t i ' This acquiescence 
s t a r t l i n g as i t may seem,especially when compared with the loud 
clamors made against the treaty of Utrecht,may however be ex-
plained In two ways: the judicious procedure of P i t t and the 
changed economic conditions. To t i c k l e the vanity of those who 
s t i l l clung to the mercantile system the minister decided to 
proceed rather cautiously against the treaty with Portugal. 
For a century or so the two nations had been bound together 
by commercial t i e s , u n t i l the l a s t of these the Methuen Treaty 
had reached the enviable p o s i t i o n of being looked up to as the 
commercial i d o l of England. But i n s p i t e of the great i n t e r e s t 
attached to t h i s t r e a t y , i t was now l o s i n g i t s importance,es-
p e c i a l l y i f compared with the other great channels of B r i t i s h 
commerce. The r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the trade may r e a d i l y be 
obtained from the f a c t that during the four years preceding t h i s 
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treaty the value of the English exports to Portugal f l u c t u a t e d 
around L560000 and the English imports from the l i t t l e kingdom 
around L4O0O00. These s t a t i s t i c s become i n s i g n i f i c a n t when 
compared with the average B r i t i s h imports of L13O0000O and ex-
ports equally large, P i t t urged a l l these points with great 
force,hut at the same time was p o l i t i c enough not to supersede 
the Portuguese treaty a l l at once;but to give the French terms 
equal to those Portugal enjoyed. 
But besides t h i s there was yet another condition g r e a t l y 
i n favor of t h i s treaty,namely the economic change which was 
sweeping away the rubbish of the old mercantile system. The 
manufacturers with whom P i t t had to deal were i n a way e n t i r e -
l y d i f f e r e n t from those who flour i s h e d under the mercantile 
system. There was now a numerous and growing body of men pos-
sessing c a p i t a l who already recognized the disadvantages a-
r i s i n g from high duties,and who were now a g i t a t i n g f o r a repeal 
of the cotton duties. There was next the factory s y s t e m , s t i l l 
i n i t s childhood;but which was already successfully replacing 
the domestic system. Such was the a c t i v i t y along t h i s l i n e 
that of the 140 cotton m i l l s i n existence nearly two thirds had 
been b u i l t w i t h i n the l a s t f i v e years. A market f o r t h e i r 
products,therefore,became a necessity. 
To Fox,however,it meant something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t . To 
him t h i s treaty s i g n a l i z e d the beginning of a new system, i n 
which the established doctrines and p r i n c i p l e s were to he ex-
changed f o r something new and untried. He denounced a l l i n c l i n a -
t i o n f o r entering into commercial rel a t i o n s with France,especial-
l y i f i n any way i t affected England's connection with Portugal. 
The reasons urged i n support of this p o l i c y were p o l i t i c a l as 
w e l l as commercial. From the p o l i t i c a l point of view the l o s s 
of Portugal might disturb the balance of powerjwhile from the 
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commercial viewpoint,England could not dispense w i t h Portugal; 
because of the raw m a t e r i a l imported from t h i s country and from 
B r a z i l . This was e s p e c i a l l y true of the cotton industry,which 
depended f o r i t s raw m a t e r i a l upon Prance,Portugal and B r a z i l . 
Each one of the members of the opposition had h i s s p e c i a l 
point of contention. Prancis f o r instance argued i n "behalf of 
the navy. " I f a commercial tr e a t y of any kind",he s a i d , "were 
ever so advantageous i n commercial ways,yet i f i t had a tenden-
cy to impair the navy i t ought to he abandoned. A commercial 
intercourse with Prance he argued f u r t h e r w i l l be c a r r i e d on 
i n small bottoms,while a remote market requires large v e s s e l s , 
gives employment and experience to our seamen and i s i n t r u t h 
the nursery on which our navy dependsl*#Pranee,on the other hand, 
impelled by a laudable ambition,was t r y i n g to wrest the c a r -
rying from England. With t h i s object i n view she had already 
made numerous concessions i n 1786 to the United States,conces-
sions f o r which not a s i n g l e r e c i p r o c a l measure was given. 
What else could such a p o l i c y mean,but that Prance expected 
a monopoly of that trade,which England enjoyed. Prance, the res-
fore,was too near f o r him. Since no ingenuity could i n any way 
increase the a c t u a l distance between the two nations other caus-
es must be sought f o r i n order to keep them as f a r apart as 
p o s s i b l e . In support of t h i s statement he urged that Prance was 
morally corrupt,and that too close r e l a t i o n s would r e s u l t i n 
contamination. "We w i l l be c i v i l i z e d out of our v i r t u e s and 
polished out of our character",he s a i d . 
But i n s p i t e of a l l the arguments that the opposition 
could b r i n g f o r t h the t e r a t y passed,and the ease with #hich ifcd 
passed through the p r i n c i p a l stages was an i n d i c a t i o n of the 
change,which had taken place i n public opinion. The commercial 
c l a s s saw the advantages of an extended market,such as 
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the French nation,consisting of 24000000 people would give. 
For t h i s reason the opposition p r a c t i c a l l y had no support i n 
the country. The effect on the trade was immediate and such 
as the English had expected. Inl786,the E n l i s h exports to 
France were hut 13000000 l i v r e s . In the course of the next 
year they rose to 49000000 l i v r e s and i n 1789 they stood at 
60913000 l i v r e s . The French exports to England did not increase 
with such astonishing r a p i d i t y . In 1787 they stood at 34200000 
l i v r e s , the next year at 31100000 and i n 1789 at 35100000 l i v r e s ^ 
These s t a t i s t i c s seem to j u s t i f y the disappointment of the 
French manufacturers i n regard to the treaty. At Abbeville, 
Amiens and L i l l e there was,indeed,much violent opposition. At 
Rouen the cotton manufacturers complained that they were unable 
to compete with the English. 
But the influence of thi s teraty was not altogether con-
fined to these two countries. I t led to other treaties^be-
tween Russia and France, the United States and Prussia and be-
tween Austria and Russia. In England besides being a decided 
break away from the mercantile system i t was also the f i r s t step 
toward free trade,and led also to the reorganization of the 
customs duties,one of the most famous measures before the 
French war.^ 
In his budget speech of 1787 P i t t strongly advocated the 
consolidation of duties,a measure,which may j u s t l y be designated 
as one of the most important i n England's commercial history.& 
He abolished the existin g duties and drawbackstand substituted 
f o r them single duties on each a r t i c l e . A l l duties now flowed 
into a common fund,called the consolidated fund. Closely con-
nected with the customs were the sinecures,not less than 196 
i n number. They were o f f i c e s granted by the Lord Treasurer, 
#Parl.HTST.26:342sq. fcLecky 5:35. 
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and t h e i r united income aggregated 142000.^ P i t t refused to 
f i l l them when they "became vacant,and when 150 had f a l l e n i n 
he abolished them altogether i n 1798. 
The abuses i n postal revenue were of another kind but 
equally g l a r i n g . Every member of Parliament was allowed to frank 
as many l e t t e r s as he pleased,by w r i t i n g his name and the word 
free on i t . This p r i v i l e g e was greatly abused. Members of Par-
liament were paid by great mercantile houses f o r franking t h e i r 
correBpondance,and thus deprived the government of an annual i n -
come of LI70000.# The new rules passed provided that no member 
of either house should frank more than ten l e t t e r s daily,and 
address them i n accordance with certain s p e c i f i e d rules. These 
r e s t r i c t i o n s proved somewhat i n e f f i c i e n t i n the beginning,but 
being carried to a great extent this source at l a s t became pro-
ductive& Rum y i e l d i n g a revenue of L32000 i n 1778 scarcely 
brought L1098 i n 1783.& Pit,however,made them productive again 
by trans f e r r i n g them from the customs to the excise l i s t . This 
means was resorted to quite frequently,and must have been an ef-
f i c i e n t remedy f o r smuggling. In 1804 the net produce from cus-
toms was L7207000 and from the excise LI6930000;while i n 1784 
they were nearly equal." 
Amongst the most famous early taxes levie d was the shop 
tax. In the second year of P i t t ' s ministry they began i t s con-
s i d e r a t i o n . Prom the very beginning i t was stigmatized by the 
opponents as being p a r t i a l and oppressiveibecause rent was no 
f a i r c r i t e r i o n of one's trade. P i t t also r e a l i z e d that rent was 
not a f a i r measure,but maintained that i t was the best obtain-
able. He moreover argued that the shopkeeper could ease his 
shoulders by s h i f t i n g i t on to the consumer,and that the c i t y of 
^Rose's Rept.pp.9,10 #Lecky 5:29. &Adolphus 4:124. &Stanhope 218. 
"Pari.Deb.1:1103. 
London i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y would pay more,not because the tax 
operated i n a p a r t i a l manner,but because there was more tax-
able property i n and near that c i t y . A f t e r considerable a g i t a -
t i o n the b i l l passed by a vote of 111 to 75. Experienceyhow-
ever, soon proved that the tax was d i r e c t and could not be 
s h i f t e d . Accordingly most of the great c i t i e s sent i n p e t i t i o n s 
against the tax a l l complaining about i t s incidence. P i t t , 
however,tried to c l i n c h the argument by r e s o r t i n g to his favor-
i t e theory of p r i c e . "Prices;' he said, "do not depend on cost 
alone,but also upon other i n c i d e n t a l expenses of the business" 
The shopkeepers,therefore,might e a s i l y advance the p r i c e and 
indemnify themselves from the tax as w e l l as from any other 
charge. Competition i n trade was not so mush a competition to 
undersell others as to s e l l at a rate,which would procure the 
dealer a proper l i v i n g p r o f i t . P r o f i t again depends on h i s 
s o c i a l p o s i t i o n j a superior trader,therefore,could not estimate 
his p r o f i t s by those of the i n f e r i o r onejbecause they must be 
i n proportion to the several c a p i t a l s . Thus i f the superior 
trader ventured to undersell the i n f e r i o r one the p r o f i t s of 
the former would become diminished,which would e f f e c t u a l l y 
prevent him from doing so. I t was f u r t h e r argued that rent 
was no f a i r c r i t e r i o n tomeasure trade by;but P i t t contended that 
i t was the f a i r e s t method by which i t could be ascertained. I f 
trade sold more than c e r t a i n l y his ahop was more valuable and 
ought to bear heavier t a x e s B y 1787 the clamor had become so 
v i o l e n t that Fox r a l l i e d to t h e i r support to help l i f t the burden 
from t h e i r shoulders. He immediately moved f o r a repeal of the 
tax;and showed that i t was oppressive. According to h i s 
s t a t i s t i c s the whole tax amounted to L59O00, Of t h i s sum 
LI7000 was paid vy Westminster alone L12000 by London and L12000 
by the adjacent v i l l a g e s . The county of Middlesex,accordingly, 
<Parl.Hist.25:1174. 
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paid L41000 out of the whole amount. The motion,however,was 
defeated by a considerable majority(vote,183 to 14 7)$ Next year 
i n March he repeated h i s motion. Time had now conclusively 
shown that the minister had been mistaken i n regard to the 
incidence of the tax. The tax moreover,fell heavier upon the 
lower classes so that a man witha small c a p i t a l and a l i m i t e d 
business paid more than h i s opulent neighbor. To make t h i s f a c t 
s t i l l more impressive he c i t e d as an example the f a c t that i n 
Bath were there were two p o u l t e r e r s , l i v i n g i n the same s t r e e t 
one paid 19s,while the other whose c a p i t a l was not near so large 
'nor h i s business so extensive paid L5,4s. But i n s p i t e of a l l 
argument the motion was l o s t once more by a vote of 141 to 98. 
The agitation,however,did not cease,and i n A p r i l of 1789 he 
moved again f o r a repeal,saying that Westminster paid more 
than London and that both together paid more than 3/4 of the 
whole. The tax moreover,was not productive. The o r i g i n a l e s t i -
mate made by P i t t was L12000,but at no time had i t produced 
more than L59000,and was now on the decline. In Westminster 
alone i t had f a l l e n o f f L4000 l a s t year. Leave was given to 
bring i n the b i l l , w h i c h was now repealed without opposition. 
Another conspicuous tax was h i s income tax< tit 1799. A l l incomes 
above L200 paid lo^;while f o r those below L200 but above L60 
the assessment was made upon a graduated scale. Incomes below 
L60 were exempt. The act f o r this tax contains 124 lengthy sec-
tions and i s e n t i t l e d "A plain,short and easy d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the d i f f e r e n t classes of the income tax,so as to render i t 
f a m i l i a r to the meanest capacity!' Prom t h i s source P i t t expect-
ed LloOOOOOO;but a disappointment i n t h i s respect compelled 
P i t t to make a f i f t h a d d i t i o n to the duty on s p i r i t s , a n d a 
f o u r t h on tea. 
P i t t ' s scheme of taxation has been severely c r i t i c i z e d 
<Parl.Hist.26:1022. 
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f o r the reason that nearly a l l of his taxes were l a i d on con-
sumption, trade and on manufacture, whatever defects there 
might have "been,it was nevertheless a great improvement upon 
the old system. To every tax-system objections can be rais e d ; 
the problem i s to f i n d the l e a s t objectionable and the most 
e f f e c t i v e system. Every system of taxation i s a h i s t o r i c 
growth. I t i s r e l a t i v e to the circumstances of the country; 
i t s resources,industries,the character of i t s people and the 
form of government. A wel3 balanced system,combining d i r e c t 
and i n d i r e c t taxation,comes nearest to r e a l i z i n g t h i s end. JTei* 
ther one of these two classes,however,possesses any inherent 
q u a l i t i e s . "Whether a tax i s good or bad does not depend upon 
the f a c t of belonging to either one of these two classes;but 
upon the kind of a d i r e c t tax or i n d i r e c t tax i t i B . Each one 
of the two classes , i t i s true,has i t s advantages. I n d i r e c t 
taxation f o r example has a corrector i n smuggling,and becomes 
unproductive,whenever the l i m i t s of productive taxation have 
been exceeded. Direct taxation,on the other hand,has no such 
corrector,consequently evasion must be resorted to when they 
become oppressive. Taxation i n P i t t ' s time was mainly d i r e c t 
i f we exclude the customs and excise duties. But t h i s does not 
ne c e s s a r i l y condemn i t . The great defects of t h i s system arose 
mainly from the kind of taxes selected,and from the frequent 
changes made. The l a t t e r had a tendency to cause economic d i s -
turbances i n production and i n d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
But the greatest defect of his system was that i t pos-
sessed no e l a s t i c i t y . The necessity f o r t h i s i s s e l f e v i d e n t . 
But before entering upon t h i s phase i t becomes necessary to 
give a b r i e f account of the state of finance j u s t preceding the 
war. The publ i c funded debt stood on January 5,1793 at 
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L238231000,exclusive of the long and short annuities,which 
amounted to L1373000. Stocks to the amount of L28677000 had 
been purchased by the commissioners,and annuities to the amount 
of L119880 had f a l l e n in,reducing the actual debt as given a-
bove to L209553559,and the annuities toL1253670. The debt cre-
ated since January 5,1793,amounted to L216898000,and the an-
nui t i e s to L283266. The whole debt at the close of the war, 
exclusive of the imperial debt stood at L426452000. The an-
nual charge on the old debt was i n 1793 above L9000000;while 
during the war a charge of L8000000 more was added. Besides the 
funded debt there was yet an unfunded debt of L10000000,when 
the war broke out. The expenditure during the war,1793 to 1801, 
rose from L12000000 to L43000000,exclusive of the annual charge 
on the public debt. The net income f o r the same period i n -
creased from 117869000 to L36320000,causing a d e f i c i t f o r every 
year. This excess of expenditure stood i n 1793 at L3397000 
and i n 1800 at L15564000. The imports and the exports of 1793 
stood a t L19000000 and L18000000 respectively. The exports 
f o r 1793 were largely native products,and these stood at 
L13892000. By 1800 they had risen to L25699000. Besides t h i s 
England developed during this period an extensive carrying trade, 
and practically^?Se ecommercial emporium of the world. In 1786 
the value of foreign merchandise exported from Great B r i t a i n 
amounted to but L4475000. But by 1800 they had increased to 
to L18847000. 
P i t t no doubt had discovered by this time that public 
finance was not controlled by the same princ i p l e s that govern 
private finance. A private person generally sneaking manages 
his expenses i n accordance with his income,that i s income deter-
mines expenditure. . In public finanee,nowever, th i s p r i n c i p l e 
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i s exactly the reverse,and income no longer determines expendit-
ure,"but i s determined by expenditure. The reason f o r t h i s i s 
simple. The two accounts which enter into every budget are i n -
come and expenditure,and of these two the l a t t e r i s the more 
refra c t o r y to deal with,especially i n war. Income too i s to 
some extent beyond the control of the f i n a n c i e r , e s p e c i a l l y 
when the larger bulk of i t i s made up from i n d i r e c t taxation as 
was the case i n P i t t ' s system. Indirect taxes of a l l sorts 
'depend f o r t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y upon the general trade of the coun-
t r y , and the revenue a r i s i n g from customs duties i s determined 
by the amount of dutiable goods imported,which i n turn again 
depends upon the character and the extent of the trade. Thus 
elements of uncertainty are introduced,which at times are be-
yond c o n t r o l , e s p e c i a l l y when smuggling and other abuses have 
crept i n . But when a system of taxation i s thus a f f l i c t e d , v i g -
or and health may be imparted by i n s t i t u t i n g proper reforms. 
This w i l l make income more certain,and having been made so i t 
w i l l l i k ewise respond to any reasonable demand that may be ex-
pected from i t . The question,then,is not how to keep expendit-
ure w i t h i n income,but how income may be brought up to meet ex-
penditure. .In the beginning of his administration P i t t t r i e d 
to apply the p r i n c i p l e as l a i d down f o r p r i v a t e finance,and 
endeavored to make expenditure conform to income. To accomplish 
t h i s , o r to make the two meet he found i t necessary to underes-
timate expenditure and overestimate income. Thus they met i n 
theory,but not i n p r a c t i c e . Uo p r i n c i p l e could insure d e f i c i t s 
b e t ter than the one he t r i e d to apply. A f t e r the committee 
had formed a peace establishment,the minister took i t as h i s b a s i s 
f o r estimating the expenses.of the government. But at no time 
did expenditure f a l l to t h i s level,and i t might s a f e l y be s a i d 
had i t not been f o r the steady increase i n revenue derived from 
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commerce there would have been a d e f i c i t every year. This p r i n -
c i p l e of P i t t as so many of his f i n a n c i a l theories only needed 
to be reversed i n order to be sound. Had he underestimated i n -
come and overestimated expenditure,instead of doing exacly the 
opposite,Pitt no doubt would have come otu a l l r i g h t . I t i s 
not the intention here to advocate the accumulation of a large 
reserve avai l a b l e i n war. No onebut the f i n a n c i e r understands 
more c l e a r l y how de l i c a t e a problem the management of these 
two accounts i s and how l i t t l e playroom sound f i n a n c i e r i n g a l -
lows,within whioh income and expenditure may f l u c t u a t e . In Eng-
land, however, there was no necessity of keeping the two thus 
close together,and a good surplus would i n no way have d i s -
turbed her i n d u s t r i e s . England had j u s t emerged from a great 
war,when P i t t ascended the m i n i s t e r i a l throne,and a surplus 
could properly have been applied to the reduction of the large 
public debt. But with the year 1793 a change i n the established 
f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y was caused by the French Wars,which a l t e r e d 
considerably the two budgetary accounts. War not only increased 
g r e a t l y the expenditure,but also made i t s t i l l more uncontrol-
able. Income,on the other hand, was extremely slow i n meeting 
t h i s inoreased demand. P i t t no doubt had good reasons f o r be-
l i e v i n g that t h i s increased demand would be l i k e l y to continue 
and therefore should have increased taxation. But even iftnewr. 
taxes had been l e v i e d to meet th i s increased expenditure he would 
have been compelled to resort to other means;for new taxes can-
not be depended on f o r meeting the expenses of an emergency; 
because they are not at once productive. But why not r a i s e 
upon the e x i s t i n g system? This may be done with success pro-
vided the f i s c a l system has been framed i n such a manner as to 
make t h i s p r a c t i c a b l e . Such a p o l i c y presupposes above every-
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thing else a broad system of revenue and a rate of taxation 
considerably below the maximum rate. A f i s c a l system embody-
ing these two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s may i n an emergency be made to 
respond to the increased needs by simply r a i s i n g i t s rate of 
taxation. But t h i s depends altogether upon the system previously 
established. A minister,then,who considers the future as w e l l 
as the present w i l l i n times of peace est a b l i s h a f i s c a l system 
which by r a i s i n g i t s rate of taxation may be made to respond 
an 
to^emergency. "fcflo war,therefore,can be managed successfully i n 
a f i n a n c i a l way,unless a proper basis has been l a i d during peace. 
Since good f i n a n c i e r i n g i n war i s only possible i f an 
adequate f i s c a l system has been established i n peace,It i s but 
proper to examine P i t t ' s system somewhat more cl o s e l y . P i t t at 
a l l times showed great aversion toward the imposition of heavy 
taxation. In the f i r s t year of his administration he imposed 
new taxes,amounting to but L400000,and his constant aim hereafter 
was to avoid new impositions as much as possible. In hi3 budget 
speech 1787 he took s p e c i a l pride i n announcing that new taxes 
to the amount of but L1500000 had been imposed. In 1790,he 
sa i d , that he had no new taxes to levy. According to h i s notion 
everything had been provided for:the running expenses were cov-
ered by taxation and the national debt was rapidly paid o f f by 
the sinking fund. There was ,therefore no occasion f o r new tax-
es and f o r providing an adequate f i s c a l system;because P i t t 
never f o r a moment entertained the Idea that his prime m i n i s t e r 
ship would be disturbed by a great war,until he was at I t s brink. 
Por these reasons,then,he neglected to f u l f i l the f i r s t require-
ment of an adequate f i s c a l system. Mr. P i t t , however,resorted 
td> the other expedient,namely, the extension of the rate of 
taxation upon the e x i s t i n g system. Various taxes were raised 
u n t i l they became abnormally high. The window tax f o r example 
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was increased from L20 f o r houses having 180 windows or more to 
L93. Duty on tea from 12.5$ to 95^. But the d i f f i c u l t y en-
countered here was that his f i s c a l system was e n t i r e l y too nar-
row, and therefore l i t t l e was accomplished;because the second 
requirement could not work f o r want of the f i r s t . Customs 
duties excise and stamp duties at least made up three f i f t h s of 
the e n t i r e revenue,whereas the remaining two f i f t h s was ob-
tained l a r g e l y from a number of taxes ,not one of which yielded 
over L500000,excepting the land and the malt duties. Among 
other taxes which P i t t might have imposed i n the very beginning 
was the income tax,for personal consumption alone would have 
been affected by increasing i t s rate. 
I t l i e s then i n the purpose of t h i s system to e s t a b l i s h 
one so broad as to meet the ordinary expenses during peace,and 
yet admit of a gradual increase i n war. Since P i t t had not 
provided adequately f o r such a system i t devolved upon him to 
make loans. But here too the minister met with a great d i f f i -
c u l t y . Frequently i t i s said that the true war chest i s a 
healthy state of industries,and that the key f o r opening t h i s 
chest i s unblemished c r e d i t . The former was i n existence i n 
abundance but the l a t t e r was sadly lacking. That there was 
plenty of c a p i t a l i s proven by the f a c t s that the value of ex-
ports 6f B r i t i s h produce and manufactures rose from L11000000 
i n 1786 to L25000000in 1801. Besides t h i s England exported an 
enormous amount of foreign merchandise,rising f r o n L4000000 i n 
1796 to L18000000 inlSOO. Bu t P i t t r a t h e r than apply t h i s key 
of unblemished c r e d i t to such a war chest,threw away the key, 
smashed the chest and robbed i t s contents. 
Mr.fJitt generally speaking endeavored to get control over 
t h i s c a p i t a l i n two ways;first,by making use of public c r e d i t 
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and secondly,by bringing the Bank of England under his contro l . 
But before entering upon these subjects i t might be well to 
point out the three ways i n which the f i n a n c i a l side of a war 
might be managed. In the f i r s t place the entire war expenditure 
may be drawn from newly levied taxes,and loans are required i n 
an t i c i p a t i o n of the tax receipts u n t i l the new revenue system 
i s becoming e f f i c i e n t . This method was entirely out of the 
question with Pitt,because he did notimpose s u f f i c i e n t taxes. 
The net produce of the taxes imposed by him between 1792 and 
1799 amounted to but L7272000,and by f a r the greater amount was 
Imposed In the l a t t e r years of this period. The loans f o r 1794 
and 1795,on the other hand,were L4500000 and L1200O0OO respec-
t i v e l y , f o r which p r a c t i c a l l y no taxes were levied i n anticipa-. 
t i o n . In the second method the entire expenditure i s met by the 
proceeds from loans. In this case s u f f i c i e n t new taxes must be 
imposed to meet the interest upon loans. The t h i r d i s a com-
bination of the twd. In the beginning P i t t no doubt meant to 
carry the war through by loans,Impose no more taxes than was 
absolutely required to meet the interest on them. Later,however, 
he was forced to resort also to considerable taxation. The re-
ceipts from loans contracted f o r up to 1801 amounted to L14 7Q00 
000. Now there i s no great danger i n resorting to loans,pro-
vided public credit i s In such a condition as to make I t prof-
i t a b l e f o r the government to borrow. During the peace period> 
securities constantly rose so that by 1792 the highest stood at 
95 and the lowest at 75. But a rapid f a l l now set i n and f i v e 
years l a t e r the highest stood at 56 and the lowest at 47. This 
was largely due to P i t t ' s reckless borrowing and to the f a c t 
that c r e d i t was not resting upon a f i r m basis. An adequate f i -
n ancial p o l i c y w i l l place public credit on so firm a basis and 
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guard i t so jealously,that the government w i l l not be c a l l e d 
upon to su f f e r ruinous discounts i n the placement of i t s se-
c u r i t i e s . Pith's loans f e l l f a r short of th i s p r i n c i p l e . In 
the eleven loans made e n t i r e l y i n Z% stock,L158650000 were ad-
vanced to the government i n exchange f o r L259215000 of 3^ stock 
making the in t e r e s t L4,18sX on the sum ac t u a l l y advanced,or at 
the rate of L100 of stock f o r L60,2s of money.% The greater 
number of loans were made i n 3^,which evidently was s a t i s f a c -
tory to both P i t t and the lender. They appealed to the former, 
because they could be made on easier terms,and to the l a t t e r 
because of the g a i n , i f stock rose. The average rate at which 
7i% stock was created betweenl793 and 1801 was L57,7s,6d of 
money f o r L100 of stock,and the average market p r i c e was L61, 
?s,6d of money f o r L100 of stock. The loss to the public upon 
the a d d i t i o n a l sum borrowed i n order that i t might be redeemed 
during that period,which was L49655000,amounted to 4.5^, or 
L2234500. For the loans of 1795 i n which the government r e -
ceived L18000000 a. c a p i t a l of L21000000 3^ stock and L4500000 
4^ stock was funded,exclusive of a long annuity of L58500. But 
the loan of 1798 made when public c r e d i t was lowest was s t i l l 
more ruinous. For every L100 advanced to the government the 
lender got L175 3^ stock,L20 4% and an annuity of 6s f o r nearly 
s i x t y - t h r e e years,or i n other words f o r every L100 advancedrthe 
the government paid an annual i n t e r e s t of L6,ls,exclusive of 
the long annuity of 6s.# How i t i s evident that a f i n a n c i a l ad-
m i n i s t r a t i o n that permits the c r e d i t of a wealthy nation to de-
c l i n e so that i t s obligations f a l l nearly b&fo can hardly be 
c a l l e d successful. How there i s no serious objection i n using 
public c r e d i t provided i t i s not abused. In the beginning of 
^Ed .13.34:316,317. #Ed.B.47:78. 
33 
the war moreover, i t i s p e r f e c t l y proper to make use of i t ; 
hut,as the war progresses and expenditure Increases taxes should 
he forced into prominence. Several conditions favor borrowing 
In the beginning of a war. The necessity f o r a temporary loan 
i s always greater i n the beginning of a war than l a t e r . Then 
again,the change from a state of peace to one of war points i n 
favor of a loan. Tf a minister succeeds i n bridging over t h i s 
chasm,and i s successful i n establishing business on a war basis 
he may extend h i s f i s c a l system with confidence. In England, 
however,there was no need of such cautious procedureibecause 
business rested upon a f a r firmer basis than public finance. 
By 1797 p r a c t i c a l l y a l l enthusiasm f o r public stock was gone 
and yet i t was at t h i s time that two of h i s largest loans were 
made. The placement of these two loans of 1796 aJld 1797,each 
one over L42000000 marks the b l i i i i a x : o f P i t t ' s use of Public 
c r e d i t . The minister was now forced to make new impositions 
because he had p r a c t i c a l l y exhausted the power of c r e d i t . In 
1797 new taxes wese therefore imposed on a l l branches of reven-
ue to the extent of L3400000.^ The next year a convoy tax on 
imports and exports was l e v i e d y i e l d i n g L1500000,making a t o t a l 
of L5000000. In the same year the Assessed Taxes also were 
tr e b l e d . Three times previous to 1797 had he raised them by 
percentage,but i n 1798 when a large addition to the revenue 
was required he inoreased them enormously. In h i s budget speech 
of 1797 P i t t estimated them at L2700000,and he thought that 
they would not f a l l f a r short of t h i s estimate. The net produce 
a f t e r t r e b l i n g them was about L50000O0,or an increase of L230O 
000.# Adding the l a t t e r to the amount named above we have a 
t o t a l of L7300000,exclusive of the tax on armorial ensigns 
^ L e v i p.91. #Dowell 
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l e v i e d i n 1798. But the receipts obtained from new taxes f o r 
t h i s period, 1^92 to 1799,amounted to but L7272000. I t follows 
therefore that no new taxes were levied; at the outbreak of t h i s 
war. In 1793 he proposed to provide f o r the remainder by way 
of loan. In the next year he repealed several taxes such as the 
glove tax,the tax on b i r t h s and burials,and imposed ad d i t i o n a l s 
on s p i r i t s , b r i c k s , t i l e s , g l a s s and paper. The current expendit-
ure,on the other hand,was increasing with great rapidity,and 
rose from L76 7000 i n 1793 toL39439000 i n 1800. The demands f o r 
revenue were therefore exceedingly heavy,and new sources of 
revenue should have been opened at the very beginning of the 
war,which would have allowed s u f f i c i e n t time f o r them to be-
come productive and would have strengthened public c r e d i t . 
But there was yet another f a c t o r that played an important 
part i n English finance,and that was the Bank of England. The 
importance of such an i n s t i t u t i o n i s w e l l understood. I t deals 
not only i n money;but also i n pr'edits,and by f a r the l a r g e r 
p o r t i o n of her business are c r e d i t transactions. P i t t abused 
t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n and i n so doing also abused c r e d i t . Instead 
of given i t the consideration which i t deserved during t h i s 
f i n a n c i a l stringency he brought t h i s I n s t i t u t i o n under h i s con-
t r o l and dictated to i t i n the most unscrupulous manner. 
Both Baring and Tooke agree that the circumstances of the em-
bar rasments which led to the panic of 1797 began i n the l a t t e r 
part of 1795. The natural conditions, of the year were of course 
beyond the control of the minister. In the cold spring and the 
wet summer lay the germs f o r the panic. The p o l i c y of the bank 
on the whole had been a conservative onejbut such moderation was 
disturbed now and then by the government when i n need of funds. 
In s p i t e of the close r e l a t i o n s between the bank and the govern-
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merit the directors succeeded inestablishing the custom of l i m i t -
ing the advances to the government to about L30000. In the A-
merican War they had been unable to hold to this rule and con-
sequentlythis l i m i t was greatly extended. Such procedure with-
out the sanction of Parliament of course was criminal,and an ap-
peal was therefore made to P i t t to provide f o r t h i s security. 
P i t t agreed to introduce a b i l l , e s t a b l i s h i n g a new l i m i t at 
L100000 and promised to refund the balance. The b i l l was quick-
l y rushed through Parliament,but without any l i m i t whatever, 
because i t s absence would permit him to extort from the bank 
any amount he pleased. The govrnment already owed the bank over 
L21000000,and this p r a c t i c a l l y meant a long time investment, 
f o r a b i l l f o r paying at least a f a i r portion of th i s debt had 
j u s t been defeated by a vote of 45 to 185. How despotically 
P i t t exercised this newly acquired power appears from the 
frequent demands made upon the bank;caused to a large extent 
by his policy of subsidies. The money scattered abroad by him 
amounted to 1200000G i n 1793,L8000000 i n 1794,and L11O0O0OO i n 
1795.^ The people at home,on the other hand,might feed on 
treasury b i l l s . The directors recognizing the dangers of such 
a p o l i c y decided not to allow the advances on treasury b i l l s 
exceed L50O0OO,and the minister solemnly promised to bring them 
with i n t h i s l i m i t . This,however, was not done and by June they 
had more than doubled;while for the next two months L1600O00 
more was demanded. Thus the bank was forced to extend i t s issue 
contrary to a l l p r i n c i p l e s of sound banking. Xh 1794 the bank 
issues already exceeded L10000000 and by Pebruary,1795,they 
stood at L140O000O. The blame for thus v i o l a t i n g the most im-
portant p r i n c i p l e i n banking l i e s a l l with P i t t . Had his 
^Banking i n a l l Nations,see Great B r i t a i n . 
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f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y been a sound one i t would not have been neces-
sary f o r him to resort to such means. For an adequate f i s c a l 
system w i l l not be forced to use terasury notes,except as a 
convenient method of i t s taxing system. 
We have already seen from P i t t ' s conduct towards the 
treasury b i l l s that he was not bound by any very scrupulous 
notions of honor. But now he departed s t i l l more from the r i g h t 
path,for notwithstanding a l l h i s solemn promises specie was . 
s t i l l send abroad i n a secret manner. In November he made f r e s h 
demands upon the bank f o r L275000oon the security of the land 
and malt taxes of 1797;another i n d i c a t i o n of poor f i n a n c i a l 
management;because a f i n a n c i e r who has jealously guarded p u b l i c 
c r e d i t can borrow on i t s strength,and need not mortgage taxes. 
The above amount was obtained on the condition that the 
treasury b i l l s be paid. P i t t took the money,but never paid 
the b i l l s . The year 1797,opened with the most gloomy apprehen-
sions and depressions. Both houses now appointed committees 
to examine the a f f a i r s of the bank,and i t was found that her out 
standing obligations were L13 7 70000,while her assets stood at 
LI7597000,leaving thus a surplus of L3000000. The bank no doubt 
would have been able to s a i l through the f i n a n c i a l f l u r r y safe-
l y , i f i t had been able to convert i t s outstanding s e c u r i t i e s 
into cash. Since the demand f o r specie i s great during a panic 
i t i s a l l important that her investments be such as to make 
such a p o l i c y p r a t i c a b l e . Had the bank instead of investing 
i n government stocks invested i n commercial paper i t would 
have been i n a p o s i t i o n to combat t h i s panic more su c c e s s f u l l y . 
Stocks and bonds are never equal to comercial paper as a prop-
o s i t i o n f o r investment;because of the time element. Stocks 
and bonds are long-lived s e c u r i t i e s , w h i l e commercial paper runs o 
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f o r but few months. Then there Is yet the futher objection a-
gainst stocks,which l i e s i n the f a c t that they fluctuate too 
much,even though they be government security. The bank hav-
ing been forced to invest heavily i n government stocks through 
the p o l i c y of Pitt,was now forced and authorized to suspend 
specie payment. This of course resulted i n the depreciation 
of the treasury b i l l s and afforded an additional blow to public 
c r e d i t . Now i n the placement of s e c u r i t i e s no i n s t i t u t i o n i s 
of more importance than a strong bank. When the war commenced 
the bank and public c r e d i t were i n a good condition,and s e c u r i -
t i e s might have been placed somexvhere near par. I t follows 
therefore that i f P i t t meant to carry on the war by loans he 
should have made a large loan right i n the beginning. The minis-
ter,however, did exactly the reverse. The loan of 1794 was but 
L4500000iwhile that of 179 7 w a s over L42500000. P i t t ' s war 
p o l i c y has been sharacterized as extravagant and j u s t l y so. 
Por P i t t undertook not only to manage English finance with a l l 
i t s incumbrances,but to finance the whole war. The r e s u l t of i t 
a l l was that i n the middle of the war he came out with a strand-
ed treasury. 
M r . P i t t thus placed himself i n a c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
Various attempts have been made to exonerate P i t t on the ground 
that he was compelled to do what he did. This no doubt was 
truejbut the circumstances which forced him to adopt such a 
p o l i c y were not altogether thrust upon him i n an unexpected man-
ner. Had he succeeded to the chancellorship at the outbreak 
of the war the argument above might be urged with some force. 
But M r . P i t t had nearly ten years of peace,and therefore was the 
maker of the circumstances that surrounded him during the war. 
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I f during these ten years he had established the system ad-
vocated above he would not have been at the mercy of the lender 
They saw that he had handcuffed himself,and consequently d i c -
tated terms i n the most unscru pulous manner. These money 
lenders besides t h i s had yet another point i n t h e i r favor,name-
l y , the usury laws,which made 5$ the maximum l e g a l r a t e . Now 
i n the placement of bonds i t i s a l l important f o r a m i n i s t e r 
to possess ample powers and M r . P i t t e i t h e r should have placed 
himself i n a p o s i t i o n so as to be able to borrow p r o f i t a b l y , o r 
should have resorted to t a x a t i o n . Even a f t e r France had de-~ 
c l a r e d war i n 1793 no new sources of revenue were opened as 
has been shown. In 1793 he imposed L300000 of assessed taxes 
and increased somewhat the duties on s p i r i t s . The year f o l l o w -
ing L1000000 more was obtained from a d d i t i o n a l s upon excise 
duties,and i n 1795,L1600000 by ad d i t i o n a l s on wine,tea,coffee, 
f r u i t , t a x e s on insurance and h a i r powder. Not a single source 
was opened t i l l 1796,when the legacy duties were imposed. T h i s , 
however,was the beginning Of a remarkable change i n P i t t ' s 
f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . The whole amount of taxes raised during the 
f o u r years,1793 to 1797,was L70000000,or a yearly average of 
L17000000; while f o r the period 1799 to 1802, L134 750000 was re'-si 
ceived,an increase of 92.5^. This negligence to create new 
sources of income at the outbreak of the French war i s d i f f i c u l t 
to e x p l a i n . I t becomes s t i l l more remarkable when one remem-
bers that f o r the Nootka Sound Armament,when but ywo B r i t i s h ves-
s e l s were seized by Spain f o r the sake of asse r t i n g her c l a i m 
to the coast of North America,a l a r g e r amount of taxes was 
l e v i e d than f o r the year 1793,after war had been declared. Be&id 
sides these two contentions,necessity and that he was at the 
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mercy of the lenders,two arguments not at a l l convincing i f 
considered i n the l i g h t of the f i s c a l system established be-
f o r e the war; Mr .Pi t t ' s funding system has also been defended 
on the ground that i t lessened the i n t e r e s t charge. This i s 
true to some extent,Z% stock requires l e s s i n t e r e s t than 7^ o r 
&/a stock. But two very p l a u s i b l e objections may be urged a-
gai n s t t h i s argument. F i r s t , P i t t ' s loans bore 5^,when consid-
ered i n the l i g h t of the money a c t u a l l y advanced. Secondly, 
ought bonds be placed a t a low i n t e r e s t and consequently at 
ruinous discounts simply f o r the sake of r e l i e v i n g the present 
generation from taxes,and throw the main burden upon the future 
How I t requires but very l i t t l e argument to show that i n the 
end a loan a t a high rate of i n t e r e s t and at par i s more eco-
nomical than one p l a c e d : i n exactly the Jopposite manner. That 
he f u l l y recognized the importance of t h i s principle,even 
though the theory of amortization was but incompletely devel-
oped,appears from h i s own words. In h i s speech of 1794 P i t t 
gave utterance to the f o l l o w i n g : " I t was always my Idea that a 
fund at^high rate of i n t e r e s t , i s b e t t e r to the country than 
those at low rates;that i s preferable to zfo and 5% to 
The reason Is that i n a l l operations of finance we should alway 
have i n view a plan of redemption, Gradually to redeem and to 
to 
e x t i n g u i s h our debt ought ever Abe the wise p u r s u i t of govern-
ment. Every scheme operation of finance should be d i r e c t e d to 
that end and should be managed with that i n view.-# But i n s p i t 
of t h i s w e l l meaning statement up to 1801 two t h i r d s of h i s 
loans were funded i n Z% stock. The reasons f o r thus departing 
from t h i s w e l l founded p r i n c i p l e seem to have been t h r e e : f i r s t , 
that h i s power f o r p l a c i n g s e c u r i t i e s were not ample enough; 
#Levi p.92. 
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secondly,a low rate of i n t e r e s t was exactly i n harmony with 
hi s theory of taxation,and l a s t l y , t h e great btalk of e x i s t i n g 
obligations created before P i t t bore Z% interest and the minis'* 
t e r followed the example f o r the sake of uniformity. None of 
these,however,afford s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r permitting them to 
offend against the canon of economy. Economy should be as 
much a part of the p o l i c y of a public man as of a private i n -
d i v i d u a l . M r . P itt then, instead of funding i n 7>% stock should 
have funded i n 7^,8^,or 9% stock,which would not only have 
been r e a d i l y taken up,but could also have been converted into 
much lower stock at the close of the war,as happened i n the 
United States a f t e r 1868. But with a Z% stock no reduction 
was possible. But there i s s t i l l another objection to h i s 
scheme of funding,and that i s the time i n which loans were con-
tracted. The two largest loans as has been shown were made, 
when public c r e d i t stood at i t s lowest point,while i n 1794 
but L4500000 was borrowed. For every L72 advanced the lender 
got L100,3^stock; a loan of 6^,therefore, could have been placed 
somewhere near par. Mr .Pitt,.tberef ore, should have made a large 
loan r i g h t i n the beginning of the war. That the minister 
should have met the French war with the same promptness with 
which he met the Nootka Sound Aumament needs no explanation. 
M r . P i t t ' s laudable ambition was to make England the strongest 
power i n Europe. She already possessed t h i s supremacy i n a 
commercial way,but p o l i t i c a l l y i t was s t i l l disputed,especially 
by France. Ought not then,a nation aspiring to such leadership 
e s p e c i a l l y when the struggle f o r the balance of power i s keen 
hold i t s e l f i n readiness,even though the future be hidden 
from her view? Bid M r . P i t t know that the controversy of the 
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Jfootka Sound Armament would turn out to be but a p o l i t i c a l 
squabble;and yet he met i t with such promptness? Ho, the 
future lay before him v e i l e d i n darkness,but t h i s i s at the 
same timl^the strongest argument i n favor of i t . 
We have now come to the end of our discussion. For the 
sake of refreshing our memories l e t us summarize b r i e f l y the 
p r i n c i p a l f a c t s of P i t t ' s administration. The reader no doubt 
w i l l r e c a l l the minister's attitude toward taxation,and how 
the tendency f o r abolishing taxes almost grew into a passion. 
This no doubt prevented the minister from establishing an 
adequate f i s c a l system',whereas the old one possessed neither 
scope nor e l a s t i c i t y . The minister,however,placed such f i r m 
confidence i n i t that even f o r the next three years a f t e r war 
had been declared no new sources were opened. Far more s t r i k i n g 
however i s h i s funding system,and the f a c t of making loans 
contrary to h i s own views. But here the same tendency i s 
v i s i b l e . We must conclude therefore that Mr.Pitt's c a r d i n a l 
p r i n c i p l e was to impose the least possible amount of taxation 
ift order to win favor i n the eyes of the p u b l i c . I t explains at 
once h i s s t r i c t economy i n peace and h i s f a i l u r e to establish 
a proper f i s c a l system. I t explains,furthermore,why no new 
sources were opened u n t i l 1796,when the legacy duties were 
f i r s t imposedjwhy he was i n a desperate position,as soon as i t 
became c l e a r that t h i s war was l i k e l y to continue for some time. 
Tt also throws l i g h t upon P i t t ' s funding system,and why he was 
at the mercy of the lenders. This conclusion moreover,is con-
firmed by h i s own words. By 1792 t h i s p o l i c y had come to f u l l 
f r u i t i o n . In t h i s year he abolished several taxes,and held out 
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the most encouraging prospects of repealing s t i l l more w i t h i n 
the next f i f t e e n years. "For althoughi'he sa i d , "we must not 
count with c e r t a i n t y on the continuance of our oresent pros-
p e r i t y , y e t unquestioahly there never was a time i n our h i s t o r y t 
t h a t from, t h e u s i t n a t i o n of Europe we might more erasonably, 
expect f i f t e e n years of peace than we may at the present 
moment V 
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